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Abstract
We study the effect of religion and intense religious experiences on terrorism by focusing
on one of the five pillars of Islam: Ramadan fasting. For identification, we exploit two
facts: First, daily fasting from dawn to sunset during Ramadan is considered mandatory
for most Muslims. Second, the Islamic calendar is not synchronized with the solar cycle.
We find a robust negative effect of more intense Ramadan fasting on terrorist events
within districts and country-years in predominantly Muslim countries. This effect seems
to operate partly through decreases in public support for terrorism and the operational
capabilities of terrorist groups.
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1 Introduction
Long before al-Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, terrorist groups were using
religion as a justification for their actions. While many terrorist groups’ motives may be of
political nature, religion often serves as a common denominator among members and is used
as vehicle to gain public support. Prominent examples include Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines,
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Irish Republican Army, and the Ulster Volunteer Force in Northern
Ireland. Since the September 11 attacks and the subsequent U.S.-led military interventions
in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorism has been on the rise. Most of the perpetrators in recent
years have claimed links to Islam and many have (self-)legitimized their terrorist attacks on
religious grounds, often referring to Islamist ideologies.1
Previous contributions on the economics of religion and terrorism have shed light on the
organizational structure of religious groups and terrorist organizations (e.g., Iannaccone, 1992;
Berman and Laitin, 2008; Berman, 2011), and on the importance of public support for terrorist
organizations (e.g., Atran, 2003; Siqueira and Sandler, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson,
2007; Tessler and Robbins, 2007; Krueger and Malecˇkova´, 2009; Malecˇkova´ and Staniˇsic´, 2011,
2013; Jaeger et al., 2015; Toft and Zhukov, 2015; Polo and Gleditsch, 2016).2 Public support
includes monetary assistance, in-kind assistance (e.g., weapons, vehicles or food), shelter,
or legitimization. We do, however, not yet understand how religion and intense religious
experiences impact upon terrorism and the public support for terrorist attacks. On the one
hand, intense religious experiences may increase the perceived gap between people of the same
faith and others, which creates the potential to depict them as enemies, thereby potentially
increasing terrorism and public support for it. On the other hand, such experiences may
induce people to see the killing of civilians as unacceptable, thereby decreasing terrorism and
public support for it.
In this study we investigate the causal effect of an intense religious experience on terrorist
events. The religious experience we focus on is one of the five pillars of Islam: Daily fasting
during the month of Ramadan. For our analysis, Ramadan and Ramadan fasting have three
1To be clear, most Muslims oppose terrorism and the ideology of Islamist groups. For example, the Pew
Research Center conducted surveys asking more than 50,000 Muslims from 13 predominantly Muslim countries
(including the ten countries listed in Table 1 below) during the years 2002–2015 whether they feel that “suicide
bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its
enemies.” 78% responded that such violence is “never” or “rarely” justified (as opposed to “sometimes” or
“often” justified).
2Other contributions to the economics of religion study the effects of religion on economic growth (e.g.,
Barro and McCleary, 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Durlauf et al., 2012; Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott,
2015) and happiness (e.g., Lim and Putnam, 2010; Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015). Many studies on
the economics of terrorism document negative effects of terrorist attacks on economic activity (e.g., Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2003; Blomberg et al., 2004; Tavares, 2004). Some other studies document that terrorist
attacks reduce happiness (e.g., Frey et al., 2009) and can change electoral outcomes (e.g., Gassebner et al.,
2008; Gould and Klor, 2010; Gassebner et al., 2011).
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intriguing characteristics. First, Ramadan fasting is seen as mandatory for adult Muslims
until they lose their good health or sanity in older age.3 Table 1 presents survey data by the
Pew Research Center from a diverse set of ten predominantly Muslim countries.
Table 1 around here
It shows that 86% of Muslim respondents fast on most or all days during Ramadan. Hence,
Ramadan fasting is indeed practiced by the large majority of Muslims living in predominantly
Muslim countries. Second, Ramadan fasting lasts from dawn to sunset every day during
Ramadan. As a result, the fasting duration varies across locations at different latitudes in
any given year. Third, the Islamic calendar follows the lunar cycle and is therefore not
synchronized with the solar cycle. As a result, Ramadan takes place in different seasons in
different years. Over the years, therefore, the duration of daily Ramadan fasting oscillates
around approximately 12 hours in any given location, with smaller amplitudes at locations
closer to the equator.
We exploit the variation in Ramadan daylight hours following from differences in latitudes
across districts within country-years and the changing seasons during which Ramadan takes
place in order to estimate the causal effect of Ramadan daylight hours on terrorist events.
For the interpretation of this effect it is important to know that most Muslims do not only
fast during Ramadan. They also engage in increased prayers and charity, abstain from sinful
behaviour, meet for pre-fast meals before dawn (called Suhur) and fast-breaking meals after
sunset (called Iftar), and recite the Quran, which Sunni Muslims often do in extra prayers at
night (called Tarawih). Hence, for most Muslims Ramadan is an intense religious experience
that allows for reevaluating their lives in light of Islamic guidance as well as for socializing
with family, friends and others. Moreover, Ramadan fasting and the religious experience
are arguably more intense when the daily Ramadan fasting is longer. Consistent with these
notions, Haruvy et al. (2018) find that alimentary abstention has positive effects on pro-social
behavior during Ramadan, but not when it is unrelated to religion. Furthermore, Campante
and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) find that longer Ramadan daylight hours increase happiness
despite leading to a decrease in GDP per capita.
Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) have also made an important methodological
contribution, as they were the first to exploit differences in latitude and the changing seasons
of Ramadan to identify a causal effect of the daily fasting duration in Ramadan and the
accompanying religious experience. In this study we build on their identification strategy
but take it to the subnational level by exploiting variation in Ramadan fasting hours across
districts within country-years.
3People who are sick, nursing or traveling are exempt from fasting during Ramadan, but must do so later.
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One reason for exploiting variation within country-years is the existing literature on deter-
minants of terrorism, which proposes many potential economic and political determinants of
terrorism at the level of countries. Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) reviewed the literature
and found 65 correlates of terrorism that had been proposed in earlier studies. Moreover, the
effects of many of these potential determinants vary across countries, time periods and per-
petrator groups (e.g., Meierrieks and Gries, 2013; Kis-Katos et al., 2014; Enders et al., 2016).
The use of country-year fixed effects implies that we implicitly control for all these potential
determinants and their heterogeneous effects across countries and over time. In addition, we
study how the effects of more intense Ramadan fasting on terrorism vary across country groups
(based on the population share of Muslims), by the background and ideology of perpetrator
groups, and over time.
We use data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, 2017), which contains the
day and location of approximately 180,000 terrorist events since 1970. We build a panel
dataset of administrative regions at the second subnational level (typically districts) and with
annual frequency. A brief look at the data reveals the following global trends in terrorism:
First, terrorist events are observed with higher frequency since the September 11 attacks.
Second, Islamist perpetrators are mainly responsible for this increase. And third, civilians in
predominantly Muslim countries are mainly suffering from this increase. These trends call for
research aimed at understanding terrorism in these countries.
Our main finding is that the probability of the occurrence of a terrorist event (or a fatal
terrorist event) in a given district and year decreases by 2–3 percentage points in predominantly
Muslim countries when the duration of the daily Ramadan fasting increases by an additional
hour. This decrease is exclusively driven by terrorist attacks by Muslim perpetrator groups,
and we find no robust effect on countries with a Muslim population share below 75%.
We discuss three potential channels. First, Ramadan fasting is known to have physiological
and psychological effects, such as body weight loss, sleep deprivation, tiredness, lassitude and
irritability (e.g., Leiper and Molla, 2003). Hence, more intense Ramadan fasting may lower
terrorism due to such short-term physiological and psychological effects. We show, however,
that the negative effects of more intense Ramadan fasting on terrorist events persist over the
entire year following a Ramadan with long fasting hours. Hence, our main findings cannot be
driven by short-term physiological and psychological effects of Ramadan fasting. Second, we
find no evidence that the negative effects of longer Ramadan fasting on terrorist events could
operate through empathy and self-restraint of (potential) terrorists.
Instead, we argue that an important channel operates through a decrease in public support
for terrorism, which in turn reduces the operational capabilities of terrorist groups. We provide
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evidence for both parts of this argument: First, based on survey data from the Pew Research
Center, we find that more intense Ramadan fasting leads to a decrease in the share of Muslim
respondents who support terrorism or, more precisely, who feel that violence is justified “to
defend Islam from its enemies.”4 Second, we provide indirect evidence for a reduction of the
operational capabilities of terrorist groups. We hypothesize that terrorist groups with little
public support and limited operational capabilities would find it particularly hard to attack
armed targets (as opposed to unarmed civilian targets), and to commit terrorist attacks in
which the perpetrators must survive. This argument is in line with Berman and Laitin (2008),
who argue that suicide attacks are effective in circumstances in which other tactics may fail.
We indeed find that the effect of longer Ramadan fasting hours on terrorist attacks against
unarmed civilian targets is considerably less pronounced than the effect on terrorist attacks
against armed targets; and that the effect on suicide attacks is considerably less pronounced
than the effects on other assaults and bombings.
The finding that a decrease of public support for terrorism can effectively reduce terror-
ist attacks is consistent with the findings of previous studies. The major contributions of
this study are the causal identification of the effect of a change in the intensity of religious
experiences on terrorism (and public support thereof), and the finding that intense religious
experience are reducing public support for terrorism rather than promoting conditions that
allow terrorism to spread.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and illus-
trates important global trends in terrorism. Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy. Section
4 presents our results. Section 5 discusses possible channels through which longer Ramadan
fasting may affect the occurrence of terrorist events. Section 6 offers a brief conclusion.
2 Data
2.1 Our time scale: Ramadan years
In most of our analysis we use data with annual frequency. However, we deviate from the
common practice of defining years based on the Gregorian calender. Instead, we base our
analysis on the Islamic Hijri calendar. The Islamic calculation of times starts in the Gregorian
year 622 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad established the first Muslim community. The
Islamic year has 12 months. The duration of the Islamic months is based on the lunar cycle.
4Clingingsmith et al. (2009) look at the effect of another intense religious experience, the Hajj pilgrimage,
which is another one of the five pillars of Islam. Consistent with our results, they find that participation in the
Hajj lowered the respondents’ beliefs that the goals for which Osama bin Laden was fighting and the methods
he was using were correct.
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In the Hijri calendar, the observation of the crescent marks the end of the previous lunar cycle
and the beginning of a new month. The duration of each month varies between 29 and 30
days, depending on actual observations of the lunar crescent.5 The Islamic year has 354 or
355 days. Accordingly, the Islamic year is 10-12 days shorter than the Gregorian year, which
is based on the solar cycle. Hence, the lunar cycle laps the solar cycle approximately every 33
years.
We construct a pseudo time scale which we label “Ramadan year.” Ramadan is the ninth
month of the Islamic year. A Ramadan year begins with Ramadan of the corresponding Islamic
year and ends on the last day before Ramadan of the subsequent Islamic year. For example,
Ramadan year 1390 begins on the 1st of Ramadan of the Islamic year 1390 (corresponding
to the Gregorian date November 1, 1970) and ends on the 30th of Shaban, which is the eight
month of the Islamic Hijri calender, in the Islamic year 1391 (corresponding to the Gregorian
date October 20, 1971). Because many readers are more familiar with the Gregorian time
scale, we additionally report Gregorian years whenever possible.6 We restrict our sample to
Ramadan years 1390 to 1436 (corresponding to the Gregorian dates November 1, 1970, and
June 5, 2016).
The reason for basing our analysis on Ramadan years is that we are interested in how the
daily fasting duration during Ramadan affects terrorism over the next year. The underlying
idea is that longer and more intense Ramadan fasting may shape beliefs and behavior in the
entire year until the next Ramadan. The disadvantages of basing the analysis on Gregorian
years would be two-fold: First, Ramadan would be early in some Gregorian years and late in
others. Second, some Ramadans overlap two Gregorian years. In these cases, Gregorian years
often contain parts of two Ramadans.
2.2 Data on Muslim population shares
Our final panel dataset, which we introduce in Section 2.4, includes districts from 190 countries
and territories from around the world. In most parts of our analysis, we stratify these countries
and territories into three groups based on the share of the Muslim population in these countries.
The reason for this stratification is that daylight hours during the month of Ramadan can be
expected to have very different effects in countries with a predominantly Muslim population
than in religiously divided countries or countries with a predominantly non-Muslim population.
We use data on the Muslim population share in 1990 from the Pew Research Center. The
5Some Muslims use a tabular calendar, which assigns 30 days to odd months and 29 days to even months.
In Iran and Afghanistan, the solar calendar is common, but Ramadan is practiced following the lunar Hijri
calendar.
6To avoid ambiguity, we report the Gregorian year that corresponds to the beginning of the respective
Ramadan year. For example, we match the Gregorian year 1970 to Ramadan year 1390.
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data are based on national censuses, demographic and health surveys, and general population
surveys and studies. We distinguish between 137 countries and territories with a Muslim
population share below 25%, 18 countries and territories with a share between 25% and 75%,
and 35 countries and territories with a share above 75%. The map in Figure 1 indicates the
countries and territories belonging to these three different country groups.7
Figure 1 around here
2.3 Data on terrorist events and global trends in terrorism
We use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, 2017), which is among the most comprehen-
sive terrorist event datasets. The GTD defines a terrorist event as “the threatened or actual
use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious,
or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2018, p. 10).
For an event to be included in the GTD it must fulfill the following three criteria: First,
the incident must be intentional. Second, it must involve violence against humans or property,
or threats thereof. Third, its perpetrators must be non-state actors. In addition, the event
must meet at least two of the following three criteria: First, the perpetrators have a political,
economic, religious, or social goal. Second, they intend to coerce, intimidate, or send some
other message to a large audience (beyond the victims). Third, the event does not occur in
the context of legitimate warfare activities (START, 2018, p. 10).
The GTD contains detailed information about the time and location of terrorist events and
the number of deaths, which includes perpetrators and victims. The START assembles the
GTD from three main data sources. First, the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services identified
terrorist events between 1970 and 1997 from wire services, government reports and major
international newspapers. Second, the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, using
archival sources, documented attacks until 2008. Third, the Institute for the Study of Violent
Groups included data on terrorist events that occurred between 2008 and 2011. The START
continuously integrated and updated the data sources. They improved machine learning and
data mining techniques to pre-screen news articles that potentially include information about
terrorist events. Currently, the GTD contains more than 180,000 terrorist events.8
7Online Appendix A lists all countries and territories in these three country groups. Further, Figure A.1
shows a histogram of Muslim population shares. It shows that 70% of the countries and territories have
a Muslim population share below 5% or above 95%. The exact thresholds used in the stratification of the
countries and territories into three groups are therefore not particularly important (see also Section 4.3).
8According to the START (2018, p. 3), the GTD does not contain any terrorist events for 1993 “because
they were lost prior to START’s compilation of the GTD from multiple data collection efforts.” As a result,
we have too few terrorist events in Ramadan years 1412, which ended on the Gregorian date February 22,
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A major advantage of the GTD is the daily temporal scale and the availability of the
location of the terrorist events. This information enables us to exploit variation in those
events within districts and country-years in our main analysis, and also to present additional
results based on quarterly aggregates of terrorist events.
We omit terrorist events that occurred outside our sample period from Ramadan year
1390 to Ramadan year 1436. In addition, we omit 12,991 terrorist events that we cannot
match to any of the 39,530 districts in our final panel dataset (see Section 2.4 for details).
The START only adds terrorist events from credible sources to the GTD. We drop 22,168
ambiguous events that the START classifies with high probability, but not certainty, as an
act of terrorism. These ambiguous events could be insurgencies, guerrilla actions, conflicts
between or within groups, or other crimes. Overall our data contains 126,346 terrorist events
that caused 254,108 terror deaths.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of terrorist events and terror deaths over our sample period.
Figure 2 around here
It shows a steady increase in terrorism up to the end of the Cold War around Ramadan year
1411, followed by a slight decrease in terrorism until the September 11 attacks in Ramadan
year 1421. Since then, terrorist events and terror deaths have increased dramatically.9
There is an important caveat when comparing terrorist events and terror deaths over long
periods. The GTD combines different data sources and the data quality may vary over time.
This has two implications: First, we should interpret Figure 2 and the subsequent figures as
illustrations of the rough pattern rather than as a precise documentation of changes over time.
Second, in our main analysis, the use of Ramadan year fixed effects or country-Ramadan year
fixed effects will be important.
Figure 3 divides the aggregate development of terrorism into the development in pre-
dominantly Muslim countries and territories (with a Muslim population share above 75%),
religiously divided countries (between 25% and 75%) and predominantly non-Muslim countries
(below 25%).
Figure 3 around here
We can see that the pronounced increase in terrorism since the September 11 attacks has
primarily occurred in predominantly Muslim countries. Among others, this group includes
1993, and 1413, which started on February 23, 1993. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these Ramadan
years (see Section 4.3).
9The number of terror incidences and deaths was particularly high in 1435 (2014) with a relatively large
number of very deadly attacks (i.e. 34 incidences with 100 or more deaths). During this year, there was also
increased activity by Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as ISIL in Syria and Iraq.
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the three countries with the most terror deaths during our sample period: Iraq (with 21%
of total terror deaths), Afghanistan (9%) and Pakistan (7%).10 During our sample period,
43% of terrorist events and 52% of terror deaths occurred in countries and territories with a
Muslim population share above 75%, even though only 15% of the world’s population lives in
these countries and territories (see Table B.2 in Online Appendix B).
The GTD also provides the names of the perpetrator groups for the majority of terrorist
events. We classify these perpetrator groups into Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Muslim
perpetrator groups have some connection to Islam, e.g., many of their members and supporters
being Muslim. We further classify Muslim perpetrator groups into groups with either an
Islamist or secular ideology. Islamist perpetrator groups claim to have a connection to Islam
and confess to terrorist attacks citing religious ideologies or religious motives. Examples
include al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Islamic State. Secular Muslim perpetrator
groups are driven by other ideologies and motives. They include separatists (or freedom
fighters), such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or the Palestine Liberation Organization, and
communist groups, such as Devrimci Sol.
For the years up to 2008, we follow the classification of Kis-Katos et al. (2014). We
update the classification for more recent years.11 In total, we identify 878 Muslim and 2,180
non-Muslim perpetrator groups. These groups are jointly responsible for 51% of terrorist
events and 67% of terror deaths in our data. We are unable to classify the perpetrators of the
remaining terrorist events because the perpetrators are unknown, multiple groups confessed to
the attack, or the press reports were ambiguous. We assign Islamist ideologies to 367 classified
Muslim perpetrator groups and secular ideologies to 207 of these groups. These groups with
Islamist or secular ideologies are jointly responsible for 85% of terrorist events and 90% of
terror deaths committed by the classified Muslim perpetrator groups. The remaining terrorist
events by Muslim perpetrators are unclassified because of imprecise information about the
perpetrators or their ideology. Therefore, it is important to interpret all results based on the
classification of perpetrator groups with caution.
Figure 4 splits the development of terrorist events and terror deaths over time by Muslim
and non-Muslim perpetrator groups. Figure 5 further splits Muslim perpetrator groups into
Islamist and secular groups.
Figures 4 and 5 around here
The resulting pattern suggests that the pronounced increase in terrorism since the Septem-
10Table B.1 in Online Appendix B lists the countries and territories with the most terrorist events and terror
deaths.
11The classification of perpetrator groups is available upon request.
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ber 11 attacks is mostly due to Islamist perpetrator groups. Non-Muslim perpetrator groups
committed terrorist attacks mainly in countries with a Muslim population share below 25%,
and Muslim perpetrator groups, in particular those with an Islamist ideology, mainly commit-
ted attacks in countries with a Muslim population share above 75% (see Table B.2 in Online
Appendix B).
For most terrorist events, the GTD contains information about the targets. We group the
targets into armed targets (such as military, police and armed rivals), unarmed civilians and
infrastructure. Most of the recent terrorist attacks targeted civilians, while a considerable
share had armed targets and very few had infrastructure targets (see Figure B.1 in Online
Appendix B). The GTD also provides information about (non-mutually exclusive) attack
types, which may reflect the broad tactics used by the perpetrators. We focus on the two
attack types that are the most common and cause the most deaths: Assaults and bombings.
In addition, we look at suicide attacks, which were rare before the September 11 attacks, but
have become more frequently used since (see Figure B.2 in Online Appendix B).12 Suicide
attacks are disproportionally lethal and occur disproportionally often in countries with a
Muslim population share above 75% (see Table B.2 in Online Appendix B).
In summary, the data suggest several general trends in terrorism: First, terrorism has been
on the rise since the September 11 attacks. Second, this increase has mainly been driven by
Islamist perpetrators, many of whom have been suicide attackers. Third, most victims have
been civilians in predominantly Muslim countries.
Finally, we examine the dynamics of terrorism within years. In particular, we look at
the share of terrorist events taking place during Ramadan. If terrorist events were uniformly
distributed across the Islamic months, we would expect a share of 8.3% of terrorist events
during Ramadan. Figure 6 shows that the actual shares of terrorist events and terror deaths
occurring during Ramadan are indeed fluctuating (with a few outliers) around a share of
approximately 8.3%.
Figure 6 around here
Averaged over the sample period, the actual shares of terrorist events and terror deaths during
Ramadan are both 7.8%, with the differences to 8.3% not being statistically significant at
conventional levels. Hence, we find no evidence that terrorism is particularly frequent or
infrequent during Ramadan (as compared to other months).
12All other assault types (including assassinations, kidnapping and hijacking) were less common than assaults
and bombings during our sample period, and led to fewer fatalities than assaults, bombings and suicide attacks.
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2.4 Our panel dataset
Our main analysis is based on panel data. The time-series dimension is 47 Ramadan years.
The cross-sectional units are administrative regions at the second subnational level (ADM2).
These units correspond to counties or, more often, districts. Compared to cross-sectional units
that do not coincide with administrative regions, the use of districts has the advantage that
the START typically provides the geo-references for cities or districts in which terrorist events
occurred. In total, our sample contains 39,886 such districts from 190 countries and territories
from around the world. The sample contains 1,874,642 observations.
We transform the terrorism data from the GTD by aggregating the terrorist events and
terror deaths by districts and Ramadan year, using the date and location information in the
GTD and the administrative (ADM2) boundaries provided by GADM. In the resulting panel,
the occurrence of terrorist events is highly right-skewed. There are terrorist events in only
27,866 (1.6%) of our observations. 25,147 of these observations have between one and four
terrorist events, while there were 980 terrorist events in Baghdad in Ramadan year 1436.
Similarly, there are deadly terror attacks only in 17,223 (0.9%) of our observations. 9,740
of these observations have between one and four terror deaths, but Baghdad suffered 3,348
terror deaths in Ramadan year 1427. By comparison, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center in New York on September 11, 2001, enter the data with 2,766 deaths. We transform
our terrorism data to avoid the results being driven by extreme outliers. In the main analysis,
we focus on the the extensive margin of terrorist events defined as 1{N > 0} · 100, where N
stands for the number of terrorist events or terror deaths by district and Ramadan year.13 The
extensive margin of terrorist events indicates whether any terrorist event occurred in the given
district and Ramadan year, and the extensive margin of terror deaths indicates whether any
fatal terrorist event occurred. We provide additional results for the intensive margin based on
the log-modulus transformation ln(N + 1) · 100.
In order to collect information on daylight hours during Ramadan, we first determine the
centroid of each district.14 We then use the centroid’s geo-coordinates to collect the district’s
daylight hours during Ramadan from the Astronomical Application Department. Finally, we
average the daylight hours in a district over all days of Ramadan in a given Ramadan year.
Hence, the Ramadan daylight hours always refer to the latest Ramadan, i.e., the first month
of a Ramadan year. This is the rationale for using the pseudo time scale “Ramadan year” in
our analysis.
Table 2 presents the Ramadan daylight hours and the occurrence of terrorist events and
terror deaths in our panel dataset, stratifying the countries and territories into three groups
13We multiply our dependent variables by 100 to ease the interpretation of the coefficient estimates.
14More specifically, we calculate the “representative” centroid (point) for each ADM2 polygon, which ensures
that the point falls inside the polygon.
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depending on their Muslim population share.
Table 2 around here
3 Empirical strategy
As highlighted in Section 1, our empirical strategy builds on Campante and Yanagizawa-
Drott (2015) and exploits key characteristics of Ramadan fasting and the Islamic calender.
Daily fasting from dawn to sunset during Ramadan is seen as mandatory and is practiced
by many Muslims (see Table 1). Daylight hours, however, vary by latitude and seasons, and
the season in which Ramadan takes place varies over time because the Islamic calender is not
synchronized with the solar cycle. As a result, the daily Ramadan fasting duration typically
varies across districts within a given country and year, and the difference in Ramadan fasting
duration between districts varies over time.
Figure 7 shows the Ramadan daylight hours in the northernmost (solid lines) and southern-
most (dashed lines) regions of Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Indonesia throughout our sample
period.
Figure 7 around here
The Ramadan daylight hours oscillate around approximately 12 hours. The amplitude depends
on the distance to the equator. The Ramadan daylight hours have larger amplitudes in
districts farther away from the equator. Zakho is the northernmost district of Iraq and Al
Faw the southernmost. The Ramadan daylight hours are longer in Zakho than in Al Faw
when Ramadan is in the summer season. Conversely, Ramadan fasting is shorter in Zakho
than in Al Faw when Ramadan is in the winter season. Ramadan daylight hours are similar for
Iraq and Pakistan, in particular in their northernmost districts, which have similar latitudes.
Ramadan daylight hours have smaller amplitudes in Somalia, which is much closer to the
equator. They are almost time constant in the southernmost district of Somalia, Kismaayo,
which is located almost on the equator. Ramadan daylight hours in the Indonesian district
Banda Aceh and Rote Ndao oscillate in opposite directions. The reason is that Banda Aceh
is in the northern hemisphere and Rote Ndao in the southern.
Ramadan daylight hours are exogenous after controlling for the latitude and the seasonality
of Ramadan. We can account for these two factors with district and Ramadan year fixed
effects. The district fixed effects capture factors that are time constant within districts, such
as geography, culture and historical heritage. The Ramadan year fixed effects capture the
Gregorian month during which Ramadan takes place in a given Ramadan year, as well as
yearly varying factors that affect all countries equally. Possible candidates for such factors
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might be the global business cycle and tectonic shifts in geopolitics, such as the end of the Cold
War, the September 11 attacks or the U.S.-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However,
even such global factors are likely to affect different countries differently.
In addition, the literature has proposed a large number of potential determinants of ter-
rorism that vary across countries and over time. For example, Gassebner and Luechinger
(2011) perform an extreme bound analysis in which they consider 65 correlates of terrorism
at the country-year level that had been proposed by previous studies. Moreover, Meierrieks
and Gries (2013), Kis-Katos et al. (2014), and Enders et al. (2016) show that some of these
determinants have heterogeneous effects across different types of perpetrators, countries and
time periods. For these reasons, we use interacted country-Ramadan year fixed effects instead
of Ramadan year fixed effects. These interacted fixed effects allow us, among others, to im-
plicitly control for the many previously proposed determinants of terrorism and to account for
their potentially heterogeneous effects. Furthermore, they also control for country-level GDP
and average happiness, which by themselves are affected by Ramadan fasting (Campante and
Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015).
Our main specification is
Terrorict = αi + βct +
3∑
G=1
γg (RDHict × 1c{c ∈ G}) + ict, (1)
where Terrorict is a terror outcome in district i of country c in Ramadan year t, e.g., the
occurrence of at least one terrorist event. αi and βct represent the region and country-Ramadan
year fixed effects mentioned above. RDHict measures the average Ramadan daylight hours in
region i of country c in Ramadan year t. 1c{c ∈ G} represents indicator variables for the three
mutually exclusive country groups G = 1, 2, 3, which we stratify by the Muslim population
share using thresholds of 25% and 75%. The indicator function 1c{c ∈ G} is equal to one if
country c is part of group G, and zero otherwise. The parameters of interest are γ1, γ2 and
γ3. They measure the average effect of Ramadan daylight hours on terror outcomes within
these three country groups. It is worth highlighting that we exploit only within country
and Ramadan year variation to identify these parameters. That is, in Figure 7 we exploit
only the vertical variation in the Ramadan fasting duration within country-years, but not the
horizontal variation across Ramadan years or any cross-country variation. This choice makes
it a conservative specification.
The error term ict absorbs unexplained variation of the terror outcome. We cluster the
standard errors of the estimated coefficients at the country-level.
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4 Results
4.1 Main results
Table 3 reports the effects of the daily fasting duration during Ramadan, measured by Ra-
madan daylight hours, on the extensive margin of terrorist events and terror deaths in panels
A and B, respectively.
Table 3 around here
Column (1) looks at average effects and accounts separately for country and Ramadan year
fixed effects. We find negative relations between Ramadan daylight hours and the two mea-
sures for the occurrence of terrorist events. These relations are not statistically significant at
conventional levels. Column (2) includes district fixed effects as well as interacted country-
Ramadan year fixed effects to account for constant region-specific characteristics and country-
level changes of all sorts over time. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors remain
similar. Hence, averaged across the globe, Ramadan daylight hours have no causal effect on
the occurrence of terrorism.
Column (3) introduces an interaction term between Ramadan daylight hours and the
Muslim population share. The coefficient estimates on this interaction term are negative,
suggesting a negative relation between the Muslim population share and the effect of Ra-
madan daylight hours on the occurrence of terrorist events. This coefficient, however, is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the model in column (3) would be
misspecified if the relation between the Muslim population share and the effect of Ramadan
daylight hours were non-linear.
We therefore turn to our preferred specification in column (4). There, we use three inter-
action terms between Ramadan daylight hours and indicator variables for whether the Muslim
population share is below 25%, between 25% and 75%, or above 75%, respectively. The point
estimates indeed hint at a non-linear relation. The effect of Ramadan daylight hours on the
occurrence of terrorist events is negative, but small and not statistically significant in pre-
dominantly non-Muslim countries; positive, but imprecisely estimated in religiously divided
countries; and negative, sizable and statistically significant at the 5%-level in predominantly
Muslim countries. The point estimates suggest that an additional hour of daily fasting during
Ramadan lowers the probability of a terrorist event in a predominantly Muslim country within
12 months after the beginning of Ramadan by 2.7 percentage points, and the probability of a
fatal terrorist event by 2.4 percentage points.
These results imply that the geography of terrorism depends on the timing of Ramadan
within the solar cycle. Suppose Ramadan daylight hours differ by 30 minutes between the
northernmost and the southernmost district of a predominantly Muslim country when Ra-
14
madan is in summer (around late June) or winter (around late December), which is approxi-
mately true for Iraq and Pakistan (see Figure 7). Further suppose that these two districts have
the same time-averaged propensity to terrorism, such that the probability of terrorist events
is the same in these two districts if Ramadan is around late March or late September. Then,
the probability of a terrorist event would be 1.35 percentage points lower in the northernmost
(southernmost) than in the southernmost (northernmost) district if Ramadan were in summer
(winter).15
We now turn to the effect of longer Ramadan fasting on the intensity (rather than the
extensive margin) of terrorism across districts. Table 4 presents the results for the log-modulus
transformation of the numbers of terrorist events and terror deaths per district (multiplied by
100).
Table 4 around here
The pattern is remarkably similar as the one seen in Table 3. Again, the effect of Ramadan
daylight hours on terrorism is close to zero in predominantly non-Muslim countries, positive
but imprecisely estimated in religiously divided countries, and negative, sizable and statisti-
cally significant in predominantly Muslim countries. We can interpret the coefficient estimates
as approximations of semi-elasticities.16 They suggest that an additional hour of daily fasting
during Ramadan lowers terrorist events and terror deaths by approximately 3.3% and 4.6%,
respectively.
4.2 Results for various time periods and perpetrator groups
In this section, we disaggregate terrorist events by different sample periods and perpetrator
groups. Our motivation is twofold. First, a more disaggregated analysis is interesting in and
of itself. Second, the disaggregation by perpetrator groups offers a falsification test.
We start by dividing the sample into three different time periods: The time prior to the
end of the Cold War (Ramadan years 1390–1411); the time between the end of the Cold War
and the September 11 terrorist attacks (Ramadan years 1412–1422); and the years after the
September 11 attacks (Ramadan years 1422-1436). Table 5 presents the results.
Table 5 around here
Focusing on the first of these time periods, column (1) shows that longer Ramadan daylight
15In comparison, the probability of a terrorist event occurring in an average year and district is 4.1% across
all predominantly Muslim countries, 14.2% in Iraq, and 38.2% in Pakistan.
16The coefficient estimates could be interpreted as semi-elasticities if we did not add one before taking
the logarithm of terrorist events or terror deaths. In that case, however, we would lose the majority of our
observations.
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hours had no effect on terrorist events, not even in predominantly Muslim countries. This
finding is not surprising, given that terrorist events were rare in these countries prior to the
end of the Cold War (see Figure 3). Columns (2) and (3) show that longer Ramadan daylight
hours reduced the probability of terrorist events in predominantly Muslim countries after the
end of the Cold War, and that this effect became slightly larger after the September 11 terrorist
attacks. These latter columns also shed light on the effects of longer Ramadan daylight hours
on the two other country groups: First, the small negative average effect on the probability
of terrorist events in predominantly non-Muslim countries is driven by the years since the
September 2011 attacks. Second, the sizable, but imprecisely estimated positive average effect
on the probability of terrorist events in religiously divided countries is driven by the entire
time period since the end of the Cold War.
We turn to the split between Muslim and Non-Muslim perpetrator groups.17 This split
offers a falsification test: If Ramadan daylight hours matter for terrorism only for reasons
related to Ramadan fasting and the associated religious and social experiences, then we should
find an effect on terrorist events committed by Muslim perpetrator groups, but no effect on
terrorist events committed by non-Muslim perpetrator groups. That is exactly what we find
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6:
Table 6 around here
Longer Ramadan daylight hours have no effect on terrorist attacks by Non-Muslim perpetra-
tors in any country group, but lead to a significantly lower probability of terrorist attacks by
Muslim perpetrators in predominantly Muslim countries.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 further split the Muslim perpetrator groups into groups
with Islamist and secular ideologies, respectively. We find few statistically significant effects,
possibly because we could not classify all the classified Muslim perpetrator groups as either
Islamist or secular. The point estimates, however, suggest an interesting pattern in how these
different Muslim perpetrator groups respond to longer Ramadan daylight hours: First, secular
Muslim perpetrator groups tend to reduce terrorist attacks in predominantly non-Muslim
countries. Second, Islamist perpetrator groups tend to increase terrorist attacks in religiously
divided countries. Lastly, both groups tend to reduce terrorist attacks in predominantly
Muslim countries.
17As discussed in Section 2.3, results based on our classification of perpetrator groups should be interpreted
with caution, as we could not assign perpetrators to a large share of the terrorist events.
16
4.3 Robustness checks
We present various robustness tests in Online Appendix C, thereby focusing on our main
results reported in Table 3, column (4). In this section, we discuss these robustness tests.
First, Table C.1 replaces the continuous variable for Ramadan daylight hours with a set
of indicator variables for different durations (and estimates separate models for each of the
three country groups). Accordingly, the specifications are fully non-parametric, and there are
no concerns about the limited support of the outcome variables. The reference category is
11.5–12.5 Ramadan daylight hours, capturing fasting durations close to the mean. We find
that our main results are driven by particularly long Ramadan fasting. That is, there is a
strong decrease in terrorist events in predominantly Muslim countries when Ramadan fasting
is particularly long, but no corresponding increase when Ramadan fasting is particularly short.
The positive (and often imprecisely estimated) effects of Ramadan daylight hours on terrorist
events in religiously divided countries are also driven by particularly long Ramadan fasting.
Second, Table C.2 documents the robustness of our main results when using alternative
thresholds of the Muslim population share to stratify the countries and territories into three
groups. In particular, it replaces the thresholds of 25% and 75% by thresholds of 10% and
90%, 20% and 80%, and 30% and 70%, respectively. The estimated effects for predominantly
Muslim and predominantly non-Muslim countries remain very similar, while the imprecisely
estimated point estimates for the countries with an intermediate Muslim population share are
quite sensitive to the chosen thresholds.18
Third, Table C.3 focuses on the population share of the largest Islamic sect rather than on
the population share of all Muslims aggregated across sects. It is based on information by the
Pew Research Center about the country-level population shares of Sunni and Shia Muslims.
The estimated effects for countries where the larger of these two sects has a population share
above 75% are very similar to the effects for countries with a total Muslim population share
above 75% (reported in Table 3).
Fourth, Table C.4 adds time-varying district-level controls for economic activity and pop-
ulation size. Our measure of a district’s economic activity is based on satellite data on the
intensity of nighttime lights, provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA). Henderson et al. (2012) and Hodler and Raschky (2014) document a high
correlation between changes in nighttime light intensity and GDP at the level of countries and
subnational administrative regions, respectively.19 The data come on a scale from 0 to 63 and
18This pattern is not surprising as most countries have a Muslim population share below 5% or above 95%
(see Figure A.1 in Online Appendix A). Therefore, the composition of the country groups with high or low
Muslim population shares does not strongly depend on the exact thresholds, while the composition of the
country group with an intermediate Muslim population share is fairly sensitive to the exact thresholds.
19Bruederle and Hodler (2018) show that nighttime lights are correlated with broad measures of local social
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in pixels of less than one square kilometer, which allows computing average nighttime light
intensity within district boundaries. Our measure of a district’s total population is based
on population data from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network
(CIESIN). Using these data, especially the nighttime lights, which are only available for the
(Gregorian) years 1992–2013, reduces the sample size considerably. We find that controlling
for these measures of local economic activity and local population does not change the sizable
negative effects of Ramadan daylight hours on the probability of terrorists events occuring in
predominantly Muslim countries.
Fifth, Table C.5 uses administrative regions at the first subnational level as cross-sectional
units. These administrative regions correspond to provinces (or states). An average province
consists of 13 districts. The coefficient estimates again suggest a large negative effect of
Ramadan daylight hours on terrorists events in predominantly Muslim countries, but the
standard errors become considerably larger when basing the analysis on provinces rather than
districts.
Sixth, Table C.6 reports results after dropping Ramadan year 1412, which ended on Febru-
ary 22, 1993, and Ramadan year 1413, which started on February 23, 1993. The coefficient
estimates and standard errors are almost identical as in Table 3, column (4). Hence, our
results are not an artefact of the missing data for the Gregorian year 1993 in the GTD.
Lastly, Table C.7 reports results when re-estimating the main specification after drop-
ping individual countries or country/territory-pairs. We sequentially drop the five countries
with most terror deaths during the sample period, i.e., Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Nigeria and
Pakistan, as well as Israel and Palestine, and the United States, which are other prominent
countries/territories in public debates on terrorism.20 The estimated effects for predominantly
Muslim and predominantly non-Muslim countries remain the same in all cases. The impre-
cisely estimated positive effect for countries with an intermediate Muslim population share
(see Table 3), however, disappears when dropping Nigeria, which has the most terrorist events
and terror deaths of all religiously divided countries.
The general pattern emerging is that Ramadan daylight hours have a robust negative effect
on terrorist events in predominantly Muslim countries. By contrast, Ramadan daylight hours
have no robust effect on terrorism in other countries.
development as well.
20The Muslim population share is below 25% in India, Israel and the United States; between 25% and 75%
in Nigeria; and above 75% in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Palestine (according to our data described in
Section 2.2).
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5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss three potential channels through which longer Ramadan fasting
may lead to a decrease in terrorist events in predominantly Muslim countries.
5.1 Short-term physiological and psychological effects of fasting
Medical studies document a plethora of physiological and psychological effects of Ramadan
fasting, including body weight loss, sleep deprivation, tiredness, lassitude and irritability (e.g.,
Leiper and Molla, 2003). A first possibility is that longer Ramadan fasting could lower terror-
ism due to such short-term physiological and psychological effects. For example, long fasting
hours could lead to (potential) terrorists who are too exhausted to commit terrorist attacks.
On the other hand, military and police forces could also be exhausted from long Ramadan
fasting hours, making terrorist attacks easier. Figure 6 already shows that terror events tend
to be neither more, nor less common in Ramadan than in other months. But to properly
test whether physiological and psychological effects are a likely channel through which longer
Ramadan fasting decreases terrorist events, we make use of the fact that physiological and
psychological consequences of fasting should be temporary. Hence, if we find that Ramadan
fasting duration has an effect on terrorism beyond the month of Ramadan and the next one
or two months, then that suggests that physiological and psychological effects are unlikely to
be the main channel.
We therefore construct a new panel dataset with the same cross-sectional units but quar-
terly frequency instead of annual frequency. The first quarter of each Ramadan year starts
with the month of Ramadan and also includes the two subsequent Islamic months: Shawwa
and Dhu al-Qidah. The second quarter contains the next three Islamic months: Dhu al-Hijjah,
Muharram, and Safar. The third quarter and the fourth are constructed analogously. Table 7
reports the effects of Ramadan daylight hours on the probability that a (fatal) terrorist attack
occurs in a given Ramadan year-quarter and district.21
Table 7 around here
Columns (1) and (4) present the results when rerunning our main specification on the quarterly
panel dataset. The effects of Ramadan daylight hours are again negative and statistically
significant in countries with a Muslim population share above 75%. In these countries, an
additional hour of Ramadan fasting reduces the probability of a terrorist event in any given
quarter and district by 1.2 percentage points and the probability of a fatal terrorist event by
21Table D.1 in Online Appendix D provides descriptive statistics for the quarterly panel dataset.
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0.9 percentage points.
Columns (2) and (5) introduce nine triple interaction terms by interacting Ramadan day-
light hours with the (same) indicator variables for the three country groups as well as indicator
variables for the second, third and fourth quarters of a Ramadan year. The double interaction
term between Ramadan daylight hours and the indicator variable for predominantly Muslim
countries now captures the effect of Ramadan daylight hours in the first quarter of any given
Ramadan year in these countries (while it captures the average effect over all four quarters
of a Ramadan year in these countries in columns (1) and (4)). We find that the coefficient
estimates of this interaction term remains very similar. This is a first indication that the
effect of longer Ramadan fasting on terrorist events in predominantly Muslim countries is not
restricted to the first quarter of a Ramadan year. In addition, we find that the coefficient
estimates of the three bottommost triple interaction terms are all very small in absolute value
and typically not statistically significant. This is a second indication that the effect of Ra-
madan daylight hours outlasts the first quarter of a Ramadan year.22 In columns (3) and (6),
we replace the country-Ramadan year fixed effects by country-Ramadan year-quarter fixed
effects and find qualitatively similar results.
We conclude that short-term physiological and psychological effects cannot be the main
channel through which longer Ramadan fasting reduces terrorist events in predominantly
Muslim countries.
5.2 Empathy and self-restraint by potential terrorists
A second possibility is that longer Ramadan fasting could increase the empathy and self-
restraint of potential terrorists, such that they become reluctant to commit terrorist attacks.
Even if we accept that longer Ramadan fasting implies a more intense religious (and possibly
social) experience for potential terrorists, it is unclear whether this increased intensity would
lead to empathy and self-restraint. On the one hand, it seems possible given prominent Quran
verses, such as verse 5:32, that condemn the use of force against innocent victims.23 On the
other hand, it is well-known that terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State,
focus in their propaganda on Quran verses that may justify violence, in particular violence
against those who are perceived as enemies.24 Therefore, it seems questionable whether intense
22The coefficient estimate on the bottommost triple interaction in column (2) is statistically significant at
the 10%-level, but the point estimate is small, suggesting that only a minor share of the initial effect is undone
until the fourth quarter of a Ramadan year.
23In its edict against terrorism in July 2005, the Fiqh Council of North America translated verse 5:32 as
follows: “Whoever kills a person [unjustly] it is as though he has killed all mankind. And whoever saves a life,
it is as though he had saved all mankind.”
24Comerford and Bryson (2017) provide a text analysis of Salafi-Jihadi (and other) documents. They find
that Salafi-Jihadi documents focus on “verses that have a backdrop of violence” (p. 19). Verse 8:60 is the
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religious experiences would lead to empathy and self-restraint among potential terrorists.
However, if they did, then we would primarily expect an effect of longer Ramadan fasting on
terrorist attacks targeted at unarmed civilians.
Table 8 reports the effects of Ramadan daylight hours on terrorist attacks on armed targets,
unarmed civilian targets and infrastructure targets, respectively.
Table 8 around here
We see that longer Ramadan daylight hours tend to reduce terrorist attacks on all types of
targets in predominantly Muslim countries. The effect on the probability of any terrorist attack
on civilian targets, however, is not statistically significant (and the effect on the probability
of a fatal terrorist attack on civilian targets is only statistically significant at the 10%-level).
Comparing the point estimates and the sample means (reported in Table 2) further suggests
that the relative change in terrorist attacks on civilian targets is smaller than the relative
changes in terrorist attacks on armed or infrastructure targets. These results suggest that
terrorist events do not decrease in response to longer Ramadan fasting because of empathy
and self-restraint by (potential) terrorists.
5.3 Public support for terrorism
We now turn to a third channel through which longer Ramadan fasting may lead to a decrease
in terrorist events in predominantly Muslim countries. This channel has two parts: First,
more intense Ramadan fasting lowers the public support for terrorism. Second, lower public
support for terrorism reduces the operational capabilities of perpetrator groups. The first
part is consistent with the observation that many Muslims are exposed to a different, more
standard interpretation of the Quran than members of Islamist perpetrator groups. It is also
consistent with the social character of Ramadan fasting in general and the fast-breaking meals
in particular. The second part of this channel is consistent with previous research showing
that public support is an important determinant of the success of (planned) terrorist attacks.
In what follows, we provide evidence for both parts of this channel.
Our evidence for the effect of more intense Ramadan fasting on public support for terror-
ism is based on survey data from the Pew Research Center. The Pew Research Center has
been running surveys since 2002 in which Muslims are asked whether they feel that violence
is “justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies.” We use data from Pew surveys in 13
top-quoted Quran verse in these documents: “And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and
of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom
you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid
to you, and you will not be wronged.”
21
countries and territories with a Muslim population share above 75%. We use the same empiri-
cal strategy as in previous tables, but the unit of observation here is a Muslim respondent from
a particular province surveyed in a particular Ramadan year. The first (second) dependent
variable is equal to 100 if the Muslim respondent feels that violence is “never” or “rarely”
(“often” or “sometimes”) justified “to defend Islam from its enemies,” and zero otherwise.25
We report the main results in columns (1) and (4) of Table 9.
Table 9 around here
We find that one additional Ramadan daylight hour increases the share of Muslims who feel
that such violence is unjustified by 14 percentage points and decreases the share who feels that
it is justified by 14 percentage points. Hence, more intense Ramadan fasting indeed lowers
public support for terrorism in Muslim countries.
In the remaining columns of Table 9, we investigate whether this effect is mainly driven by
the more religious respondents or the less religious ones. Columns (2) and (5) document that
longer Ramadan daylight hours reduce support for terrorism among the 57% of respondents
who pray five times a day as well as among respondents who pray less frequently. Columns (3)
and (6) split respondents into those who fast on most or all days during Ramadan and those
who fast less frequently. The coefficient estimates are again similar, but based on a smaller
sample and less precisely estimated.26 The finding that more intense Ramadan fasting lowers
public support for terrorism also among the most religious respondents recalls the finding by
Clingingsmith et al. (2009) that participation in the Hajj pilgrimage lowered the respondents’
beliefs that the goals for which Osama bin Laden was fighting and the methods he was using
were correct. However, our findings are more general: they show that less religious persons
are affected by longer Ramadan fasting too. This result may suggest that the effects of longer
Ramadan fasting do not only operate through religious experiences, but also through the
associated social experiences.
Our evidence for the second part of the proposed channel – the reduction in the operational
capabilities of perpetrator groups – is indirect and based on the following two hypotheses:
First, perpetrator groups with little public support and limited operational capabilities are
relatively more likely to attack unarmed civilian targets as opposed to armed targets because
the latter are harder to attack, especially when the perpetrators want to escape alive and thus
need shelter or an escape route. Second, and along the same lines, perpetrator groups with
little public support and limited operational capabilities are relatively more likely to commit
25These two indicator variables are both zero if a respondent refuses to answer or responds “do not know.”
26The point estimates suggests slightly smaller effects for the more religious respondents, but these differences
are not statistically significant at the 10% level in any specification.
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suicide attacks as opposed to other types of terrorist attacks. This second hypothesis draws
on Berman and Laitin (2008), who argue that suicide attacks remain effective in conditions in
which other tactics would fail and are therefore chosen more often “when conditions disfavor”
(p. 1948).27
The results reported in Table 8 and discussed in Section 5.2 are consistent with the first
hypothesis. In addition, Table 10 reports the effects of Ramadan fasting hours on the most
common and most lethal types of terrorist attacks.
Table 10 around here
Columns (1) and (2) show the effects of longer Ramadan daylight hours on the probability
of assaults and bombings of any type (i.e., suicide attack or not). In predominantly Muslim
countries, these effects are negative and statistically significant (with the exception of the
effect on lethal bombings). However, when only focusing on suicide attacks in column (3), we
find that the effect of longer Ramadan daylight hours becomes relatively small and far from
statistically significant. This pattern is consistent with the second hypothesis.
Based on these different pieces of evidence, we can conclude that the following channel
may indeed be important: The intense experience of longer Ramadan fasting lowers public
support for terrorism, and lower public support constrains perpetrator groups and reduces
their operational capabilities. As a result, perpetrators groups commit fewer and operationally
easier terrorist attacks, leading to a decrease in terrorist events and terror deaths.28
6 Concluding remarks
The long history of terrorist groups with a religious background and the recent surge of terrorist
attacks by Islamist perpetrators in predominantly Muslim countries has motivated us to study
27Consistent with this notion, Benmelech et al. (2015) show that precautionary house demolitions in the
Gaza Strip, which are intended to reduce the operational capabilities of perpetrator groups by preventing the
launching of attacks from specific locations (but are unrelated to the owners and occupants of these houses),
lead to an increase the number of suicide attacks. In contrast, they find that punitive house demolitions
decrease the number of suicide attacks.
28We reported in Section 4 that longer Ramadan daylight hours do not reduce (and may even increase)
terrorist events in countries with a Muslim population share between 25% and 75%. The question arises as
to why the proposed channel is not at work in these countries. A possible reason is related to the effect of
Ramadan fasting duration on the views of Muslims on non-Muslims. Table E.1 in Online Appendix E presents
results based on survey questions on the views on Christians and Jews in six predominately Muslim countries.
It shows that longer Ramadan daylight hours increase the share of Muslim respondents with unfavorable
views on Christians and Jews. Therefore, some Muslims seem to feel more at unease with both terrorism and
non-Muslims after intense Ramadan fasting. It is conceivable that these countervailing effects are one of the
reasons why longer Ramadan fasting does not lead to a reduction in terrorist events in religiously divided
societies.
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the effect of religion and intense religious experiences on terrorism. We have focused on one
of the five pillars of Islam: Daily fasting from dawn to sunset during the month of Ramadan.
Building on Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015), we have exploited the fact that the lunar
Islamic calender is not synchronized with the solar cycle. We have identified causal effects by
focusing on differences in Ramadan fasting duration across districts within country-years.
We have found a sizable and robust negative effect of more intense Ramadan fasting on
terrorist events. This decrease is restricted to Muslim perpetrator groups and the time period
in which such groups have been active. The evidence suggests that this effect is driven neither
by short-term physiological and psychological consequences of alimentary abstention, nor by
self-restraint of (potential) perpetrators. Instead, the evidence is consistent with a channel
operating through a decrease in public support for terrorism and a reduction in the operational
capabilities of perpetrator groups. Our results are thus consistent with previous research
finding that a decrease of public support for terrorism can effectively reduce terrorist attacks.
We add to the literature by showing that intense religious experiences may reduce public
support for terrorism among Muslims rather than being a breeding ground for terrorism.
References
Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study
of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93 (1), 113–132.
Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science, 299 (5612), 1534–1539.
Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. (2003). Religion and Economic Growth across Coun-
tries. American Sociological Review, 68 (5), 760–781.
Benmelech, E., Berrebi, C. and Klor, E. F. (2015). Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evi-
dence from House Demolitions. Journal of Politics, 77 (1), 27–43.
Berman, E. (2011). Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. MIT
Press.
— and Laitin, D. (2008). Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model.
Journal of Public Economics, 92 (10-11), 1942–1967.
Blomberg, S. B., Hess, G. D. and Orphanides, A. (2004). The Macroeconomic Conse-
quences of Terrorism. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51 (5), 1007–1032.
Bruederle, A. and Hodler, R. (2018). Nighttime Lights as a Proxy for Human Develop-
ment at the Local Level. PLOS One, 13 (9), e0202231.
24
Bueno de Mesquita, E. and Dickson, E. S. (2007). The Propaganda of the Deed: Ter-
rorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. American Journal of Political Science, 51 (2),
364–381.
Campante, F. and Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2015). Does Religion Affect Economic Growth
and Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130 (1), 615–
658.
Clingingsmith, D., Khwaja, A. I. and Kremer, M. (2009). Estimating the Impact of the
Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam’s Global Gathering. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
124 (3), 1133–1170.
Comerford, M. and Bryson, R. (2017). Struggle Over Scripture Charting the Rift Between
Islamist Extremism and Mainstream Islam. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
Durlauf, S. N., Kourtellos, A. and Tan, C. M. (2012). Is God in the Details? A Re-
examination of the Role of Religion in Economic Growth. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
27 (7), 1059–1075.
Enders, W., Hoover, G. A. and Sandler, T. (2016). The Changing Nonlinear Relation-
ship between Income and Terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60 (2), 195–225.
Frey, B. S., Luechinger, S. and Stutzer, A. (2009). The Life Satisfaction Approach to
Valuing Public Goods: The Case of Terrorism. Public Choice, 138 (3-4), 317–345.
Gassebner, M., Jong-A-Pin, R. and Mierau, J. O. (2008). Terrorism and Electoral
Accountability: One Strike, You’re Out! Economics Letters, 100 (1), 126–129.
—, — and — (2011). Terrorism and Cabinet Duration. International Economic Review,
52 (4), 1253–1270.
— and Luechinger, S. (2011). Lock, Stock, and Barrel: A Comprehensive Assessment of
the Determinants of Terror. Public Choice, 149 (3-4), 235.
Gould, E. and Klor, E. (2010). Does Terrorism Work? Quarterly Journal of Economics,
125 (4), 1459–1510.
Haruvy, E. E., Ioannou, C. A. and Golshirazi, F. (2018). The Religious Observance
of Ramadan and Prosocial Behavior. Economic Inquiry, 56 (1), 226–237.
Henderson, J. V., Storeygard, A. and Weil, D. N. (2012). Measuring Economic
Growth from Outer Space. American Economic Review, 102 (2), 994–1028.
25
Hodler, R. and Raschky, P. A. (2014). Regional Favoritism. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 129 (2), 995–1033.
Iannaccone, L. (1992). Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes,
and Other Collectives. Journal of Political Economy, 100 (2), 271–291.
Jaeger, D. A., Klor, E., Miaari, S. and Paserman, M. D. (2015). Can Militants Use
Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 58 (3), 528–549.
Kis-Katos, K., Liebert, H. and Schulze, G. G. (2014). On the Heterogeneity of Terror.
European Economic Review, 68, 116–136.
Krueger, A. and Malecˇkova´, J. (2009). Attitudes and Action: Public Opinion and the
Occurrence of International Terrorism. Science, 325 (5947), 1534–1536.
Leiper, J. B. and Molla, A. (2003). Effects on Health of Fluid Restriction during Fasting
in Ramadan. European Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 57 (S2), S30.
Lim, C. and Putnam, R. D. (2010). Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction. Amer-
ican Sociological Review, 75 (6), 914–933.
Malecˇkova´, J. and Staniˇsic´, D. (2011). Public Opinion and Terrorist Acts. European
Journal of Political Economy, 27 (1), S107–S121.
— and Staniˇsic´, D. (2013). Does Higher Education Decrease Support for Terrorism? Peace
Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 19 (3), 343–358.
McCleary, R. M. and Barro, R. J. (2006). Religion and Economy. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 20 (2), 49–72.
Meierrieks, D. and Gries, T. (2013). Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth.
Journal of Peace Research, 50 (1), 91–104.
Polo, S. M. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2016). Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist
Tactics in Civil War. Journal of Peace Research, 53 (6), 815–829.
Siqueira, K. and Sandler, T. (2006). Terrorists versus the Government: Strategic Inter-
action, Support, and Sponsorship. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50 (6), 878–898.
START (2017). Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [Datafile]. National Consor-
tium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Retrieved from
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd in summer 2017.
26
START (2018). Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Codebook. National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
Tavares, J. (2004). The Open Society Assesses its Enemies: Shocks, Disasters and Terrorist
Attacks. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51 (5), 1039–1070.
Tessler, M. and Robbins, M. D. H. (2007). What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and
Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States? Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution, 51 (2), 305–328.
Toft, M. D. and Zhukov, Y. M. (2015). Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and
Counterinsurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus. American Political Science Review, 109 (2),
222–238.
27
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Country-level population shares of Muslims
Notes: Muslim population share in % in 1990. Darker colors indicate higher shares. Section 2.2 describes the
data.
Figure 2: Terrorist events and terror deaths by Ramadan year
Notes: Section 2.1 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” and Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
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Figure 3: Terrorist events and terror deaths by Muslim population share
Notes: Section 2.1 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” and Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
Figure 4: Terrorist events and terror deaths by Muslim vs Non-Muslim perpetrator groups
Notes: Section 2.1 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” and Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
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Figure 5: Terrorist events and terror deaths of Islamist and secular Muslim perpetrator groups
Notes: Section 2.1 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” and Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
Figure 6: Share of terrorist events and terror deaths during the month of Ramadan
Notes: Section 2.1 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” and Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
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Figure 7: Average daylight hours during Ramadan
(a) Iraq (b) Pakistan
(c) Somalia (d) Indonesia
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Table 1: Ramadan fasting in Muslim countries
Country Ramadan fasting: Obs.
most/all days
(1) (2)
Egypt 94% 4,653
Indonesia 90% 2,769
Jordan 95% 2,890
Kuwait 99% 471
Mali 71% 622
Pakistan 78% 9,244
Palestine 93% 3,540
Senegal 85% 742
Tunisia 93% 981
Turkey 81% 5,524
Weighted average 86% 31,436
Notes: Results are based on Muslim respondents in surveys
by the Pew Research Center from the years 2007–2013.
Column (1) shows the share answering “During most or all
days of Ramadan” or “During all of Ramadan and other re-
ligious holidays” as opposed to lower frequency when asked
“How often, if at all, do you fast?” Column (2) provides
the number of responses on which the share in column (1)
is based.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the district-Ramadan-year panel data, by country group
Muslim population share:
< 25% 25–75% >75%
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ramadan daylight hours 12.24 1.81 12.18 0.93 12.26 1.37
Muslim pop. share (in %) 2.28 3.90 48.45 8.75 96.25 5.24
Terrorist events
All events:
Extensive margin 1.32 11.40 1.77 13.18 4.09 19.80
Log-modulus 1.94 20.29 2.71 24.32 7.80 53.10
By perpetrator groups (extensive margins):
Muslim 0.11 3.33 0.74 8.55 2.60 15.91
Non-Muslim 0.79 8.86 0.25 4.96 0.30 5.46
Islamist 0.06 2.42 0.45 6.68 1.92 13.72
Secular Muslim 0.03 1.81 0.15 3.89 0.40 6.35
By targets (extensive margins):
Armed targets 0.37 6.04 0.48 6.93 1.86 13.50
Civilians 1.01 9.99 1.46 11.99 3.19 17.57
Infrastructure 0.27 5.19 0.25 4.97 0.76 8.71
By attack types (extensive margins):
Assault 0.46 6.75 0.78 8.78 1.91 13.68
Bombing 0.64 8.00 0.78 8.82 2.47 15.51
Suicide attack 0.01 1.22 0.11 3.28 0.62 7.83
Terror deaths
All deaths:
Extensive margin 0.67 8.15 1.15 10.66 3.03 17.15
Log-modulus 1.52 24.33 4.06 53.53 10.04 82.97
By perpetrator groups (extensive margins):
Muslim 0.06 2.51 0.57 7.54 2.00 14.00
Non-Muslim 0.40 6.33 0.13 3.58 0.17 4.14
Islamist 0.04 1.87 0.37 6.11 1.55 12.37
Secular Muslim 0.01 1.18 0.08 2.83 0.25 5.04
By targets (extensive margins):
Armed targets 0.23 4.75 0.35 5.87 1.49 12.11
Civilians 0.49 7.01 0.92 9.53 2.27 14.89
Infrastructure 0.06 2.52 0.08 2.88 0.33 5.76
By attack types (extensive margins):
Assault 0.31 5.52 0.62 7.84 1.58 12.45
Bombing 0.20 4.43 0.41 6.41 1.64 12.69
Suicide attack 0.01 1.19 0.10 3.22 0.59 7.67
Observations 1,591,279 93,671 189,692
Notes: Section 2 describes the data.
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Table 3: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on the occurrence of terrorist events and terror
deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Terrorist event (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours -0.077 -0.069 0.019
(0.073) (0.084) (0.100)
× Muslim pop. share -1.686
(1.319)
× Muslims <25% -0.049
(0.075)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.026
(1.208)
× Muslims >75% -2.704**
(1.209)
B: Terror deaths (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours -0.040 -0.033 0.046
(0.044) (0.049) (0.068)
× Muslim pop. share -1.504
(1.111)
× Muslims <25% -0.018
(0.040)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.231
(1.389)
× Muslims >75% -2.359**
(0.970)
Country fixed effects (FE) Yes No No No
Ramadan year FE Yes No No No
District FE No Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642
Notes: Panel fixed effects regressions. Dependent variables are the extensive margins for terrorist events in
panel A and terror deaths in panel B. Section 2 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and all the variables
used. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate
statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table 4: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on the number of terrorist events and terror deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Terrorist events (log-modulus)
Ramadan daylight hours -0.071 -0.075 0.026
(0.101) (0.105) (0.124)
× Muslim pop. share -1.931
(1.656)
× Muslims <25% -0.057
(0.097)
× Muslims 25-75% 2.071
(2.126)
× Muslims >75% -3.286**
(1.582)
B: Terror deaths (log-modulus)
Ramadan daylight hours -0.052 -0.024 0.105
(0.087) (0.126) (0.157)
× Muslim pop. share -2.474
(2.732)
× Muslims <25% -0.010
(0.111)
× Muslims 25-75% 4.488
(4.941)
× Muslims >75% -4.646**
(2.336)
Country fixed effects (FE) Yes No No No
Ramadan year FE Yes No No No
District FE No Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642
Notes: Panel fixed effects regressions. Dependent variables are the log modulus of terrorist events in panel
A and for terror deaths in panel B, with the log-modulus being multiplied by 100. Section 2 introduces the
time unit “Ramadan year” and all the variables used. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and
reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table 5: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on terrorism in different time periods
Ramadan years:
<1412 1412-1422 >1422
(1) (2) (3)
A: Terrorist event (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% 0.008 0.091 -0.388**
(0.046) (0.141) (0.179)
× Muslims 25-75% -0.162 0.422 2.763
(0.178) (0.705) (3.650)
× Muslims >75% -0.142 -4.433* -5.095**
(0.177) (2.650) (2.344)
B: Terror deaths (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% 0.013 0.057 -0.195**
(0.038) (0.075) (0.087)
× Muslims 25-75% -0.094 1.270*** 3.542
(0.112) (0.339) (4.665)
× Muslims >75% -0.142 -4.433* -5.095**
(0.145) (2.268) (1.837)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 877,492 398,860 598,290
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Sample is restricted to different
time periods indicated in the top row. (Ramadan years 1412 and 1421 corresponds to Gregorian years 1991
and 2000.) Dependent variables are the extensive margins for terrorist events in panel A and terror deaths
in panel B. Section 2 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and all the variables used. Standard errors
are clustered at the country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the
1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table 6: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on terrorism by different perpetrator groups
Perpetrator groups:
Non-Muslim Muslim Islamist Secular M.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Terrorist event (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.030 0.032 -0.012 -0.018*
(0.031) (0.046) (0.011) (0.011)
× Muslims 25-75% -0.246 1.679 1.775 -0.014
(0.308) (1.589) (1.739) (0.092)
× Muslims >75% 0.041 -2.306** -0.910 -0.852
(0.179) (0.929) (0.893) (0.664)
B: Terror deaths (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.007 0.027 -0.006 -0.011*
(0.019) (0.034) (0.009) (0.007)
× Muslims 25-75% -0.102 1.640 1.631 0.029
(0.157) (1.572) (1.610) (0.050)
× Muslims >75% -0.007 -1.719** -0.751 -0.620
(0.109) (0.769) (0.721) (0.510)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Dependent variables are
based on the extensive margins for terrorist events in panel A and terror deaths in panel B. In each column
they are restricted to terrorist events by the type of perpetrator groups indicated in the top row. Section 2
introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” discusses the classification of perpetrator groups, and describes all
the variables used. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table 7: Effect of longer Ramadan fasting on terrorism across quarters of Ramadan years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Terrorist event (ext. margin) Terror deaths (ext. margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.022 -0.024 -0.039 -0.009 -0.010 -0.025
(0.036) (0.036) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015)
× Quarter 2 0.001 0.014 -0.001 0.013
(0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.008)
× Quarter 3 0.003** 0.032 0.001 0.027
(0.001) (0.037) (0.001) (0.027)
× Quarter 4 0.003* 0.021 0.001 0.024*
(0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.013)
× Muslims 25-75% 0.512 0.506 0.522 0.595 0.593 0.675
(0.609) (0.607) (0.740) (0.655) (0.654) (0.774)
× Quarter 2 0.001 0.066 0.000 0.032
(0.001) (0.098) (0.001) (0.140)
× Quarter 3 0.011*** 0.091 0.004* -0.154
(0.004) (0.151) (0.002) (0.160)
× Quarter 4 0.013*** -0.195 0.006* -0.197
(0.005) (0.411) (0.003) (0.348)
× Muslims >75% -1.161** -1.165** -1.260** -0.917* -0.919* -0.945*
(0.531) (0.530) (0.487) (0.504) (0.503) (0.491)
× Quarter 2 -0.012 0.267 -0.008 0.022
(0.008) (0.352) (0.006) (0.244)
× Quarter 3 0.008 0.057 0.004 0.022
(0.006) (0.291) (0.005) (0.256)
× Quarter 4 0.020* 0.071 0.015 0.069
(0.011) (0.218) (0.009) (0.135)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-RY FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-RY-quarter FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 7,498,568 7,498,568 7,498,568 7,498,568 7,498,568 7,498,568
Notes: Panel regressions with district fixed effects and either country-Ramadan year (RY) or country-Ramadan
year-quarter fixed effects. Sample is based on the panel dataset with quarterly frequency explained in Section
5.1. Dependent variables the extensive margins for terrorist events in panel A and terror deaths in panel
B. Section 2 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and the data. Standard errors are clustered at the
country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table 8: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on terrorism across targets
Targets:
Armed targets Civilians Infrastructure
(1) (2) (3)
A: Terrorist event (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.016 -0.044 0.011
(0.028) (0.061) (0.028)
× Muslims 25-75% 0.727 1.116 -0.063
(0.771) (1.068) (0.273)
× Muslims >75% -1.798*** -1.496 -0.613**
(0.538) (0.916) (0.279)
B: Terror deaths (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.000 -0.027 0.007
(0.015) (0.031) (0.011)
× Muslims 25-75% 0.613 1.062 0.128
(0.607) (1.178) (0.191)
× Muslims >75% -1.515*** -1.407* -0.325**
(0.453) (0.782) (0.148)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Dependent variables are based
on the extensive margins for terrorist events in panel A and terror deaths in panel B. In each column they
are restricted to terrorist events with the type of target indicated in the top row. Section 2 introduces the
time unit “Ramadan year” and all the variables used. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and
reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table 9: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on public support for terrorism in Muslim countries
Violence against “enemies” of Islam:
Never/rarely justified Often/sometimes justified
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ramadan daylight hours 14.09* -14.39***
(8.21) (4.92)
× Praying 5 times a day 18.79** -15.20***
(8.95) (4.01)
× Less praying 20.10** -15.85***
(9.38) (4.35)
× Fasting most/all days 20.68 -6.88
(14.21) (7.93)
× Less fasting 21.31 -8.69
(14.67) (8.05)
Praying 5 times a day 15.63 -7.65
(12.61) (7.29)
Fasting most/all days 8.14 -22.68*
(14.90) (12.06)
Province fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52,452 46,171 31,436 52,452 46,171 31,436
Notes: Panel regressions with province and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. The sample is based on Pew
surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in the years 2002–2015. The dependent variable in columns
(1)–(3) [columns (4)–(6)] is equal to 100 if the Muslim respondent answers “never justified” or “rarely justified”
[“often justified” or “sometimes justified”] when asked whether they personally feel that “suicide bombing and
other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies,” and
zero otherwise. Praying 5 times a day is equal to 1 if the Muslim respondent answered “every day five times”
when asked “how often, if at all, do you pray?” (Less praying indicates a lower frequency.) Fasting most/all
days is equal to 1 if the Muslim respondent answered “during most or all days of Ramadan” or “during all of
Ramadan and other religious holidays” when asked “how often, if at all, do you fast?” (Less fasting indicates a
lower frequency.) In all columns, the sample contains the ten Muslim countries and territories listed in Table 1.
In addition, it includes Bangladesh, Morocco and Uzbekistan in columns (1) and (4), and just Bangladesh
and Uzbekistan in columns (2) and (5). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of provinces.
***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table 10: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on terrorism by attack types
Attack type:
Assault Bombing Suicide attack
(1) (2) (3)
A: Terrorist event (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.048 -0.017 0.002
(0.032) (0.057) (0.003)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.172 0.664 0.474
(1.244) (0.799) (0.489)
× Muslims >75% -1.327** -1.775** -0.220
(0.607) (0.688) (0.519)
B: Terror deaths (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.041 0.004 -0.000
(0.025) (0.037) (0.002)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.054 0.792 0.462
(1.148) (0.822) (0.477)
× Muslims >75% -1.224** -1.325 -0.236
(0.517) (0.804) (0.524)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Dependent variables are based
on the extensive margins for terrorist events in panel A and terror deaths in panel B. In each column they
are restricted to terrorist attacks of the type indicated in the top row. Section 2 introduces the time unit
“Ramadan year” and all the variables used. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and reported
in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
41
Online Appendix to “Religion and Terrorism:
Evidence from Ramadan Fasting”
Roland Hodler, Paul A. Raschky and Anthony Strittmatter1
Sections:
A. List of countries and territories, stratified by Muslim population shares
B. Additional descriptive statistics based on the Global Terror Database
C. Robustness tests
D. Descriptive statistics for quarterly panel
E. Ramadan fasting and views on Christians and Jews
1Hodler: Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen; CEPR; CESifo; email: roland.hodler@unisg.ch.
Raschky: Department of Economics, Monash University; email: paul.raschky@monash.edu. Strittmatter:
Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen; email: anthony.strittmatter@unisg.ch.
1
A. List of all countries and territories, stratified by Mus-
lim population shares
This appendix lists all countries and territories in our sample and stratifies them into three
groups based on their Muslim population share (see Section 2.2).
Countries and territories with a Muslim population share below 25%: American
Samoa, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Barbados,
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Bu-
rundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Central African Re-
public, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dem.
Rep. of Congo, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France, French Guiana, Gabon,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya,
Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Martinique, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Netherlands Antilles, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
North Korea, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Puerto Rico, Rep. of Congo, Reunion, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao
Tome and Principe, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Wallis and Futuna, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Countries and territories with a Muslim population share between 25% and 75%:
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Tanzania.
Countries and territories with a Muslim population share above 75%: Afghanistan,
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pak-
istan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Western Sahara, Yemen.
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Figure 8: Histogram of Muslim population shares across countries and territories
Notes: Section 2.2 describes the data on Muslim population shares.
3
B. Additional descriptive statistics based on the Global
Terror Database
Table B.1: Terrorist events and terror deaths in countries and territories with more than 1,000
events during sample period
Rank Country Terrorist events Terror deaths Death rate
1. Iraq 17,610 54,305 3.08
2. Pakistan 11,304 17,876 1.58
3. India 8,735 14,498 1.66
4. Afghanistan 7,995 22,946 2.87
5. Colombia 6,082 8,909 1.46
6. Peru 5,247 7,682 1.46
7. United Kingdom 3,933 2,475 0.63
8. Philippines 3,735 4,114 1.10
9. El Salvador 3,052 3,731 1.22
10. Spain 2,854 1,117 0.39
11. Turkey 2,729 3,131 1.15
12. Nigeria 2,663 17,730 6.66
13. Thailand 2,464 1,722 0.70
14. Chile 2,222 215 0.10
15. Sri Lanka 2,071 9,464 4.57
16. France 2,057 397 0.19
17. Somalia 1,993 4,045 2.03
18. Algeria 1,990 8,287 4.16
19. Russia 1,773 3,555 2.01
20. United States 1,743 3,447 1.98
21. Yemen 1,644 3,638 2.21
22. Israel 1,629 1,388 0.85
23. South Africa 1,613 1,886 1.17
24. Lebanon 1,541 2,681 1.74
25. Palestina 1,523 1,111 0.73
26. Egypt 1,468 2,010 1.37
27. Italy 1,458 399 0.27
28. Libya 1,441 1,278 0.89
29. Bangladesh 1,370 867 0.63
30. Guatemala 1,292 2,006 1.55
31. Syria 1,181 7,491 6.34
32. Greece 1,134 237 0.21
33. Germany 1,052 129 0.12
Notes: Sample period covers Ramadan years 1390–1436 (corresponding to Gregorian years 1970–2015). Death
rate is the average number of terror deaths per terrorist event.
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Table B.2: Terrorist events and terror deaths worldwide, by Muslim population shares
Muslim population share All
<25% 25–75% >75%
Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Population
Population (in mio.) 4,314 79% 313 6% 835 15% 5,462
Terrorist events
Total 66,103 52% 5,611 4% 54,632 43% 126,346
By perpetrators:
Non-Muslim 36,154 96% 373 1% 1,307 3% 37,834
Muslim 4,524 17% 2,759 10% 19,193 72% 26,476
Islamist 2,287 12% 1,888 10% 14,523 78% 18,698
Secular Muslim 1,053 28% 417 11% 2,308 61% 3,778
By targets:
Armed targets 11,493 42% 808 3% 14,792 55% 27,093
Civilians 44,169 54% 4,211 5% 33,830 41% 82,210
Infrastructure 8,854 70% 349 3% 3,532 28% 12,735
By attack type:
Assault 13,176 50% 1,851 7% 11,282 43% 26,309
Bombing 31,574 48% 2,097 3% 31,639 48% 65,310
Suicide attack 385 9% 269 6% 3,542 84% 4,196
Terror deaths
Total 94,603 37% 26,997 11% 132,508 52% 254,108
By perpetrators:
Non-Muslim 58,255 92% 3,131 5% 1,941 3% 63,327
Muslim 15,502 15% 18,713 18% 72,478 68% 106,693
Islamist 10,634 12% 14,642 16% 64,367 72% 89,643
Secular Muslim 1,605 24% 1,636 25% 3,388 51% 6,629
By targets:
Armed targets 18,371 31% 3,071 5% 38,672 64% 60,114
Civilians 53,294 36% 19,613 13% 76,890 51% 149,797
Infrastructure 8,781 59% 864 6% 5,277 35% 14,922
By attack type:
Assault 42,534 48% 14,675 17% 30,990 35% 88,199
Bombing 24,153 22% 7,574 7% 77,938 71% 109,665
Suicide attack 6,910 15% 2,924 6% 35,836 78% 45,670
Notes: Sample period covers Ramadan years 1390–1436 (corresponding to Gregorian years 1970–2015). Popu-
lation size is from the World Bank Development Indicator (WBDI) data and averaged over the sample period,
but excludes countries and years with missing information. The WBDI does not provide population data for
French Guiana, Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Reunion, Taiwan, Wallis and Futuna, and Western Sahara.
Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
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Figure B.1: Terrorist events and terror deaths by targets
Notes: Section 2.1 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” and Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
Figure B.2: Terrorist events and terror deaths by attack types
Notes: Section 2.1 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year,” and Section 2.3 describes the terrorism data.
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C. Robustness tests
Table C.1: Non-linear effects of Ramadan daylight hours, by country groups
Muslim population shares:
<25% 25-75% >75% <25% 25-75% >75%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Terrorist event (ext. margin) Terror deaths (ext. margin)
Ramadan daylight <10.5h 0.251 0.006 -0.115 0.259 -0.093 -0.234
(0.223) (0.578) (1.402) (0.174) (0.569) (1.272)
Ramadan daylight 10.5-11.5h 0.119 -0.064 -0.442 0.095 0.046 -0.430
(0.198) (0.409) (1.041) (0.166) (0.349) (0.976)
Ramadan daylight 12.5-13.5h -0.525 2.221*** -2.195** -0.261 2.386*** -1.972**
(0.393) (0.725) (1.039) (0.194) (0.737) (0.888)
Ramadan daylight >13.5 -0.706 2.389*** -2.983** -0.342 2.588*** -2.668**
(0.435) (0.743) (1.346) (0.227) (0.750) (1.208)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,591,279 93,671 189,692 1,591,279 93,671 189,692
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Sample is restricted to countries
with a Muslim population share below 25% in columns (1) and (4); between 25% and 75% in columns (2) and
(5); and above 75% in columns (3) and (6). Dependent variables are the extensive margins for terrorist events
in columns (1)–(3) and terror deaths in columns (4)–(6). The explanatory variable are indicator variables
for the Ramadan daylight hours. The omitted category are Ramadan daylight hours between 11.5h and
12.5h. Section 2 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and all the variables used. Standard errors are
clustered at the country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the
1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table C.2: Different thresholds for the Muslim population share
Terrorist event Terror deaths
(extensive margin) (extensive margin)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <10% -0.036 -0.008
(0.071) (0.036)
× Muslims 10-90% -0.569 -0.254
(0.751) (0.754)
× Muslims >90% -2.729* -2.412**
(1.500) (1.196)
× Muslims <20% -0.051 -0.019
(0.076) (0.040)
× Muslims 20-80% 1.163 1.316
(1.202) (1.360)
× Muslims >80% -2.733** -2.377**
(1.214) (0.976)
× Muslims <30% -0.049 -0.018
(0.075) (0.040)
× Muslims 30-70% 1.450 1.651
(1.307) (1.518)
× Muslims >70% -2.942** -2.557***
(1.170) (0.939)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642 1,874,642
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Dependent variables are the
extensive margins for terrorist events in columns (1)–(3) and terror deaths in columns (4)–(6). Section 2
introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and all the variables used. Standard errors are clustered at the
country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table C.3: Country classification according to population share of largest Islamic sect
Terrorist event Terror deaths
(extensive margin) (extensive margin)
(1) (2)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Largest sect <25% -0.049 -0.018
(0.075) (0.040)
× Largest sect 25-75% 0.666 0.869
(1.148) (1.305)
× Largest sect >75% -2.612** -2.258**
(1.278) (1.030)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,874,642 1,874,642
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Dependent variables are the
extensive margins for terrorist events in column (1) and terror deaths in column (2). Section 2 describes the
time unit “Ramadan year,” the dependent variables and the Ramadan daylight hours. Section 4.3 describes
the indicator variables that stratify the countries into three groups based on the population share of the
largest Islamic sect in any given country. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and reported in
parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table C.4: Controls for local population and local economic activity
Terrorist event (ext. margin) Terror deaths (ext. margin)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.456*** -0.458*** -0.459*** -0.277** -0.278** -0.278**
(0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.799 1.813 1.713 2.922 2.932 2.877
(2.552) (2.564) (2.455) (3.440) (3.448) (3.376)
× Muslims >75% -5.604** -5.599** -5.569** -5.742** -5.738** -5.686**
(2.233) (2.234) (2.249) (2.420) (2.422) (2.437)
Population (in logs) 0.119* 0.090
(0.071) (0.056)
× Muslims <25% 0.102 0.071
(0.069) (0.048)
× Muslims 25-75% 0.534 -0.598
(1.027) (0.965)
× Muslims >75% 0.663 0.976
(0.542) (0.690)
Nighttime lights (in logs) 0.135 0.093
(0.105) (0.091)
× Muslims <25% 0.158*** 0.094**
(0.052) (0.045)
× Muslims 25-75% -0.598* -0.441**
(0.322) (0.208)
× Muslims >75% 0.444 0.452
(0.806) (0.714)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 915,763 915,763 915,763 915,763 915,763 915,763
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Dependent variables are the
extensive margins for terrorist events in columns (1)–(3) and terror deaths in columns (4)–(6). Section 2
introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and most of the variables used. Population (in logs) is based on the
population data from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN). Nighttime
lights (in logs) is based on the intensity of nighttime lights measured by weather satellites and provided by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). We add a small constant (0.01) before taking the
logarithm of a district’s average nighttime light intensity. The sample is restricted to all observations for which
the population and nighttime lights data are available. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and
reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table C.5: Provinces, i.e., administrative regions at the first subnational level (ADM1)
Terrorist event Terror deaths
(extensive margin) (extensive margin)
(1) (2)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% 0.302 0.194
(0.537) (0.481)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.389 1.119
(3.743) (3.283)
× Muslims >75% -6.112 -5.538
(6.326) (6.283)
Province fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes
Observations 147,486 147,486
Notes: Panel regressions with province and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. The sample is based on the
aggregation of our standard panel dataset at the province level. Dependent variables are the extensive margins
for terrorist events in column (1) and terror deaths in column (2). Section 2 introduces the time unit “Ramadan
year” and the dependent variables. In our province-level panel dataset, the means [standard deviations] of
the dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are 10.121 [30.161] and 6.048 [23.838], respectively. Standard
errors are clustered at the country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance
at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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Table C.6: Dropping Ramadan years due to missing data in the GTD
Omitted Ramadan years:
1413 1412 & 1413
(1) (2)
A: Terrorist event (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.047 -0.046
(0.076) (0.076)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.025 1.028
(1.205) (1.205)
× Muslims >75% -2.716** -2.710**
(1.215) (1.212)
B: Terror deaths (extensive margin)
Ramadan daylight hours
× Muslims <25% -0.017 -0.016
(0.041) (0.041)
× Muslims 25-75% 1.233 1.238
(1.382) (1.379)
× Muslims >75% -2.360** -2.359**
(0.974) (0.969)
District fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,834,756 1,794,870
Notes: Panel regressions with district and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. Column (1) omits Ramadan
year 1413, which started on the Gregorian date February 23, 1993. Column (2) omits Ramadan years 1412
and 1413. The rationale is that the GTD contains no terrorist events for the Gregorian year 1993 “because
they were lost prior to START’s compilation of the GTD from multiple data collection efforts” (START, 2018,
p. 3). Dependent variables are the extensive margins for terrorist events in panel A and terror deaths in
panel B. Section 2 introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and all the variables used. Standard errors are
clustered at the country-level and reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the
1%/5%/10%-level.
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D. Descriptive statistics for quarterly panel
Table D.1: Descriptive statistics for quarterly panel, by country group
Muslim population share:
< 25% 25–75% >75%
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Terrorist events (ext. margin) 0.48 6.91 0.65 8.02 1.83 13.41
Terror deaths (ext. margin) 0.22 4.73 0.40 6.34 1.30 11.33
Observations 6,365,116 374,684 758,768
Notes: Section 5.1 describes the construction of the quarterly panel and Section 2.3 the terrorism data.
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E. Ramadan fasting and views on Christians and Jews
Table E.1: Effects of longer Ramadan fasting on views on Christians and Jews
Views on Christians: Views on Jews:
Favorable Unfavorable Favorable Unfavorable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ramadan daylight hours -22.351*** 35.747*** -11.294** 23.750**
(7.495) (10.347) (5.138) (11.915)
Province fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Ramadan year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,129 22,129 22,928 22,928
Notes: Panel regressions with province and country-Ramadan year fixed effects. The sample is based on Pew
surveys by the Pew Research Center. The dependent variable in column (1) [column (2)] is equal to 100 if
the Muslim respondent answers “very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” [“very unfavorable” or “somewhat
unfavorable”] when asked about their views on Christians, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in
column (3) [column (4)] is defined accordingly, but based on views on Jews. These questions were asked in
Pew surveys in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine and Turkey in the years 2004–2011. Section 2
introduces the time unit “Ramadan year” and the Ramadan daylight hours. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the level of provinces. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
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